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11.1 Introduction
In the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in the volume of assets
transferred through mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures. This trend was
especially pronounced outside of the United States. Gugler et al. (2003) re-
port that the number of deals consummated in continental Europe in-
creased from 986 during 1981 to 1990 to 8,609 during 1991 to 1998. The 
authors also note that the average value of these transactions rose from
$186.1 million in 1991 to $414.1 million in 1998 (in constant dollars). This
new wave of corporate restructuring has stimulated an important debate
concerning whether these changes in ownership improve economic eﬃ-
ciency.
Researchers typically address this question by analyzing the impact of
ownership change on short-run stock prices (event studies), long-run stock
prices, or accounting proﬁts (e.g., Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987; Jensen
1988, 1993; and McWilliams and Siegel 1997). There are several problems
with the use of such performance indicators. One problem with the use of
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Tomas Lindstromstock prices is that many economists question the validity of the eﬃcient
markets hypothesis (see Shleifer 2001), which conjectures that changes 
in share prices following announcements of ownership changes reﬂect
changes in future real economic performance. This is a critical issue, since
market eﬃciency provides the basis for use of the event study methodology.
Furthermore, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) have demonstrated that inad-
equate attention has been paid to research design issues in many event
studies in the management literature. Accounting proﬁtability has long
been known to be an imperfect measure of economic performance (see
Fisher and McGowan 1983).
Policy decisions regarding the optimal level of ownership change should
be based on analysis of the eﬀects of these transactions on economic eﬃ-
ciency. It is also important to note that many ownership changes involve
privately-held companies or occur below the ﬁrm level (e.g., divisions of
large, publicly-traded ﬁrms), which makes it virtually impossible to assess
stock price or accounting proﬁtability eﬀects, except for those transactions
involving large, publicly-traded ﬁrms. The end result is that analyses of
ownership changes based solely on information from public companies
could yield misleading estimates of the antecedents and consequences of
ownership changes.
To overcome these limitations, several authors (e.g., Lichtenberg and
Siegel 1987, 1990a, 1990b; McGuckin and Nguyen 1995; Maksimovic and
Phillips 2001; Harris, Siegel, and Wright 2005) have asserted that a more
desirable methodology is to assess the total factor productivity (TFP) of
plants before and after ownership changes. Empirical evidence from the
United States has been derived from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal 
Research Database (LRD).1 The LRD is a plant-level ﬁle constructed by
linking information from the quinquennial Census of Manufactures and
the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Empirical evidence from the United
Kingdom has been derived from the Annual Respondents Database
(ARD). The ARD consists of plant-level records from the U.K. Annual
Census of Production. Several of these studies have been based on re-
stricted samples (e.g., a sample consisting mainly of long-lived plants or
the universe of plants in one or two industries), which potentially limits the
ability to generalize from these ﬁndings.
From a welfare perspective, it is also interesting to examine how owner-
ship change relates to characteristics of the workforce. Existing plant-level
studies are constrained by having aggregate data on workers at the estab-
lishment and limited information on the composition of the workforce.
That is, while authors can make inferences regarding the eﬀects of owner-
ship change on the average worker at the plant, they cannot follow individ-
398 Donald S. Siegel, Kenneth L. Simons, and Tomas Lindstrom
1. Excellent reviews of LRD-based studies are presented in Caves (1998) and Bartelsman
and Doms (2000).ual employees at these establishments or analyze detailed changes in the
composition of human capital that arise in the aftermath of ownership
change.
As a result, these studies have provided limited evidence on how changes
in corporate control aﬀect the demand for diﬀerent types of workers. For
example, policy makers might wish to consider the impact of ownership
change on male versus female, Swedish-born versus immigrant, young ver-
sus old, and highly-educated versus non-highly-educated workers. The use
of matched employer-employee data also enables us to directly explore the
dynamics of workforce/human capital adjustment at the establishments in-
volved in such transactions, in the sense that we can track the movement
and relative compensation of employees who experienced an ownership
change.
The purpose of this study is to ﬁll these gaps by relating productivity pat-
terns associated with ownership change to numerous worker characteris-
tics. Our empirical analysis is based on matched employer-employee data
for over 19,000 Swedish manufacturing establishments, which constitute
the majority of that nation’s population of manufacturing plants, for the
years 1985 to 1998. Our sample also includes information on every worker
in those plants, along with their complete work history during this fourteen-
year period.
We also assess whether there are diﬀerential eﬀects on productivity for
diﬀerent types of ownership changes: partial and full acquisitions and di-
vestitures, and unrelated and related diversiﬁcation. Finally, we present the
ﬁrst plant-level ﬁndings from continental Europe and analyze more recent
data on ownership change.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.2 pro-
vides a review and critique of existing plant-level studies of the conse-
quences of ownership change. A discussion of various theories relating to
the impact of ownership change on economic performance is presented 
in section 11.3. Section 11.4 describes the construction of the micro data
set and its salient characteristics. Section 11.5 outlines the econometric
methodology. Section 11.6 presents empirical results. The ﬁnal section,
11.7, contains preliminary conclusions.
11.2 Review and Critique of Plant-Level Studies of the Relationship
between Ownership Change, Productivity, and Labor Demand
11.2.1 Productivity
Table 11.1 presents a summary of plant-level studies of the relationship
between ownership change and productivity. Several stylized facts emerge
from this table. The ﬁrst is that there have been no studies based on evi-
dence from continental Europe. Second, most authors report that plants













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.involved in an ownership change experience an improvement in productiv-
ity after the change in ownership. Third, the magnitude of the productivity
increase appears to vary by type of ownership change (e.g., leveraged buy-
outs versus management buyouts), which underscores the importance of
disaggregating ownership change. Fourth, evidence on relative productivity
before ownership change is mixed. Some authors report that plants in-
volved in ownership changes are less productive than comparable plants
before the change in ownership, while others report the opposite.
These mixed results could be due to diﬀerences in the nature of the
samples and the time frames of the analyses. Some authors have analyzed
mostly large plants (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel 1987, 1990b), while others
have focused on a single industry (e.g., McGuckin and Nguyen 1995). Sev-
eral papers use quinquennial Census of Manufactures data, which makes
it diﬃcult to analyze timing eﬀects with suﬃcient precision. This is poten-
tially important since studies based on annual data indicate that major
changes occur soon after the change in ownership.
The ﬁrst plant-level study of the relationship between ownership change
and TFP was Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), based on a (mostly) balanced
panel of 20,493 U.S. LRD establishments in 450 manufacturing industries.
In subsequent empirical work (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990a, 1990b), the
authors were able to analyze a more unbalanced sample of LRD plants.
Their econometric analysis was based on the following two-stage approach.
In the ﬁrst stage, the authors computed residuals from within-industry
(four-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation [SIC]) OLS regressions of 
log-linear Cobb-Douglas production functions of the following form (with
error term suppressed):
(1) ln Qit    1 ln Kit    2 ln Lit    3 ln Mit
where Qit, Kit, Lit, and Mit refer to output, capital, labor, and materials, re-
spectively, in plant i and year t. The residuals from equation (1) can be in-
terpreted as an estimate of the relative productivity of each plant (i.e., rel-
ative to plants in the same industry). In the second stage of their model, the
authors regressed the productivity residuals on a set of dummy variables
denoting whether the plant had changed owners:
(2) RELPRODit   f(OCit s)
where RELPRODitis the productivity residual of plant iin year t, the error
term is again suppressed, and OCit s is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
plant i was involved in an ownership change in year t   s (where s can be
negative or positive) or 0 otherwise.
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) conducted a similar analysis of the eﬀects
of ownership change on economic eﬃciency, based on the complete popu-
lation of plants in the food manufacturing industry (SIC 20) in the U.S. 
Census of Manufactures. They used the same method as in the previous 
Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital 401LRD-based studies to construct estimates of relative TFP, as well as labor
productivity. However, they did not employ precisely the same second-stage
approach, since they do not observe annual ownership changes, only those
occurring between the quinquennial Census of Manufactures.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) computed similar measures of relative
TFP, based on the following translog production function (error term sup-
pressed):
(3) ln Qit    i    1 ln Kit    2 ln Lit    3 ln Mit    4 (ln Kit)2
   5  (ln Lit)2    6 (ln Mit)2    7 ln Kit ln Lit
   8 ln Kit ln Mit    9 ln Lit ln Mit    10AGEit    t
where  i is a plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect,  t is a technology shift parameter,
and AGEit denotes the age of the plant.
Table 11.1 reveals that most authors have used a two-stage method to as-
sess the antecedents and consequences of ownership change. In contrast,
we estimate within industry (four-digit SIC), one-stage, augmented Cobb-
Douglas production functions. We also experimented with using similar
one-stage translog production functions, and found that this had little
eﬀect on our econometric results.
11.2.2 Labor Demand
Table 11.2 summarizes plant and ﬁrm-level studies of the impact of own-
ership change on employment and earnings. Much of the plant-level evi-
dence seems to indicate that ownership change does not result in statisti-
cally signiﬁcant declines in the employment and earnings of production
workers at production establishments. In fact, the most comprehensive ev-
idence, presented in McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), suggests that earnings
and employment increase after ownership change. On the other hand,
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990a) ﬁnd that employment and wage growth are
lower in central oﬃce or auxiliary establishments in the aftermath of an
ownership change, suggesting that white-collar workers suﬀer more than
blue-collar employees when such transactions occur.
Table 11.2 also reveals that these eﬀects vary by type of ownership
change. For instance, Baldwin (1998) reported that mergers had a negative
impact on the employment and compensation of nonproduction workers.
Similar patterns emerge in the aftermath of leveraged and management
buyouts. Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) ﬁnd that 45 percent of the
ﬁrms involved in hostile takeovers laid oﬀ workers, aﬀecting about 6 per-
cent of the workforce.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies of the
impact of the eﬀects of ownership change on the demand for diﬀerent types
of workers (e.g., men versus women, Swedish-born versus immigrant,
younger versus older, highly-educated versus non-highly-educated). In the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tfollowing section, we provide a brief summary of theories relating to the
impact of ownership change on performance.
11.3 Brief Review of Theories of the Impact of 
Ownership Change on Economic Performance
Scholars have proposed numerous theories relating to the antecedents
and consequences of changes in ownership. Several authors have asserted
that corporate control changes reduce ﬁrm performance. This class of the-
ories usually focuses on several managerial ﬂaws. For instance, Dennis
Mueller (1969) hypothesizes that managers attempt to maximize growth
instead of shareholder wealth. This leads corporate executives to adopt
policies that beneﬁt them ﬁnancially and professionally, at the expense of
proﬁt or shareholder wealth maximization. Unfortunately, these actions
could lead to expansion of the ﬁrm beyond an optimal point.
In a similar vein, Richard Roll (1986) and Mathew Hayward and Don-
ald Hambrick (1997) argue that the hubris of CEOs and other managers
causes them to systematically overestimate their ability to manage the
companies they wish to acquire. According to this view, overconﬁdence in-
duces managers to overpay for target ﬁrms, resulting in a decline in the eco-
nomic performance of the acquirer.
Michael Gort (1969) advanced a theory predicting that ownership
change has a neutral impact on economic performance. In his framework,
ownership change is induced by divergent expectations between buyers
and sellers regarding the future value of corporate assets. He also seeks to
explain ﬂuctuations in merger activity over time. Thus, his model predicts
that the magnitude of diﬀerences in buyer and seller expectations of the
share prices of target ﬁrms is likely to be higher during periods of economic
disturbance, which he deﬁnes as periods of sustained share price increases
or when ﬁrms experience rapid technological change. Note that Gort’s
model is a variation of the familiar theme of stockholder wealth maxi-
mization. That is, he assumes that the market expects no gain to result from
the merger because acquirers have diﬀerent expectations than the market.
Therefore, the premium earned by the acquired ﬁrm is exactly oﬀset by a
loss to the acquiring ﬁrm’s shareholders.
Several theories predict that ownership change has a positive eﬀect on
economic performance. James Meade (1968) asserted that takeovers are
part of a process of natural selection, whereby eﬃcient managers are re-
warded through survival, while ineﬃcient managers are punished via take-
overs. According to Henry Manne (1965) and Michael Jensen (1988), the
takeover threat constrains the self-serving behavior of managers, and in-
duces them to pursue proﬁt-maximizing strategies. Jensen (1993) extends
this theory by noting that certain types of ownership changes (e.g., man-
agement buyouts) result in changes in governance and incentive structures
404 Donald S. Siegel, Kenneth L. Simons, and Tomas Lindstromthat reduce agency costs. These agency costs could be substantial in large
corporations, where there is considerable separation of ownership and
control.
Frank Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel (1987) advanced a matching the-
ory of ownership change, in which the ﬁt between heterogeneous plants
and owners is reﬂected in productivity. The matching theory of ownership
change borrows heavily from the theory of labor turnover or job separation
proposed by Jovanovic (1979). In the Lichtenberg and Siegel framework,
low productivity signals a bad match, which is the key determinant of the
ﬁrm-level decision to maintain or relinquish ownership of a given plant.
The model has two empirical implications. The ﬁrst is that the lower the
productivity of a plant, relative to average productivity in its industry, the
higher is the probability of an ownership change. A second implication of
the model is that when an ownership change occurs, even an average match
can be expected to lead to above average productivity growth because a
better match will result.
Thomas Holmes and James Schmitz (1990) outlined an equilibrium
model of ownership change (or business transfer) that pertains mainly to
smaller ﬁrms. In their model, high quality managers buy companies that im-
plement high quality projects based on new ideas. Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002) also assert that high quality projects and high quality managers are
complements. Moreover, they assert that mergers and takeovers play a role
in spreading new technologies and reallocating capital to more eﬃcient
uses and to better managers. Thus, according to the authors, ownership
change plays a role that is similar to the eﬃciency-enhancing, dynamic 
adjustment associated with entry and exit. The notion that technological
change and ownership change are complements suggests that these trans-
actions should result in a decline in employment and skill upgrading.2
Many of the previously mentioned theories of ownership change do not
have obvious implications for changes in the workforce below the top man-
agement level. Indeed, for ownership changes that occur according to the
logic of the theories advanced by Mueller, Roll, Hayward and Hambrick,
and Gort, we might be surprised to observe any substantial changes in a
plant’s workforce in the aftermath of ownership change. In contrast, at
least some of the theories that predict an improvement in productivity sug-
gest that this enhancement may arise due to new managers’ changes to the
workforce. Indeed, the theory of Jovanovic and Rousseau speciﬁcally ad-
dresses such changes. Thus, evidence on the degree to which workforce
changes occur may shed light on the relative merit of the aforementioned
theories of ownership change.
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2. There is considerable evidence in the literature on skill-biased technological change (see
Siegel [1999] and Link and Siegel [2007] for comprehensive reviews of this literature) that
technological change is associated with downsizing and skill-upgrading of the workforce.In the following section, we describe the data set that allows us to assess
the impact of ownership on performance and workforce characteristics.
11.4 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on a special ﬁle that links detailed infor-
mation on Swedish workers and the establishments that employ them. This
ﬁle has data on the output and inputs of these plants, which enables us to
construct estimates of total factor productivity (TFP). It also contains in-
formation on a wide variety of worker characteristics, such as level of edu-
cation, age, gender, and national origin.
11.4.1 Plants
The primary unit of observation in our study is the plant. Following con-
ventional international standards, the plant or establishment is deﬁned as
a physically independent unit within a ﬁrm. It is assumed that each plant
focuses on just one line of business (i.e., one activity). If a company is in-
volved in multiple activities at the same physical address, the ﬁrm is asked
to report separate ﬁgures for each activity. Each ﬁgure is then tied to a sep-
arate plant or sometimes recorded under the plant’s largest activity. In
most cases, however, ﬁrms focus on a single activity, implying that the lo-
cal units are seldom split into several plants. Plants that were considered to
be nonactive and help plants, such as sales oﬃces (or what would be con-
sidered auxiliary establishments in the United States), were also excluded
from the data.
According to Swedish law, each business is required to report informa-
tion to Statistics Sweden on an annual basis. In 1946, the certainty crite-
rion for inclusion in the annual survey of manufacturing plants was estab-
lished at a minimum of ﬁve employees and 10,000 SEK (about 1,300 U.S.
dollars) in production value. In 1990, this certainty threshold was raised to
a minimum of ten employees, while a sampling procedure is applied to the
smaller plants. In 1997, the certainty threshold oﬃcially was raised to a
minimum of twenty employees, but as will be seen shortly, evolving sam-
pling procedures for smaller plants meant that this change had little eﬀect.3
Tables 11.3 and 11.4 compare our sample of 19,010 plants to the popu-
lation of Swedish manufacturing establishments. Table 11.3 contrasts the
size distribution of our sample (top panel) with the corresponding size dis-
tribution for the population of Swedish manufacturing plants (bottom
panel) in 1986, 1990, and 1995. These ﬁgures reveal that our sample is not
completely representative in terms of size, since it is more heavily weighted
towards plants with more than ten employees. On the other hand, table
406 Donald S. Siegel, Kenneth L. Simons, and Tomas Lindstrom
3. We have a small number of mining plants in our sample. The threshold increases in 1990,














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































811.4 indicates that the sample constitutes a large fraction of economic ac-
tivity in the manufacturing sector, especially for plants with more than ten
employees.
11.4.2 Ownership Change
Table 11.5presents statistics on the incidence of ownership change. Over
the entire sample period (1985 to 1998), 5.1 percent of plants experienced
at least one ownership change. These rates of plant turnover appear to be
slightly higher when they are weighted by value-added and employment
(columns 2 and 3). An analysis of the annual ﬁgures reveals that the inci-
dence of ownership change appears to have risen during the late 1980s,
reaching a peak in the early 1990s.
In table 11.6, we present evidence on the incidence of several types of
ownership change involving our sample of plants during the sample period
(1986 to 1998). We can identify whether an acquisition or divestiture in-
volves the buying or selling of an entire ﬁrm. Note that the overwhelming
majority of such changes are full acquisitions or divestitures, although the
relative importance of such transactions diminishes when they are
weighted by value-added or employment (columns 2 and 3). The full and
partial acquisition categories indicate whether all or part of a ﬁrm is ac-
quired: 4.2 percent of plants in a year changed owners as part of a full-ﬁrm
takeover, and 0.9 percent changed owners through a part-ﬁrm takeover,
summing to the total annual ﬁgure of 5.1 percent. The full and partial di-
vestiture categories indicate whether the original owner ceded ownership
of all versus some plants in a ﬁrm, regardless of the new owner(s) of those
plants. We have also identiﬁed whether the buyer had existing plants in the
same (four-digit) industry, which we refer to as a related acquisition.
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Table 11.4 Sample plants (N   19,010) relative to population of Swedish
manufacturing plants
Variable 1986 1990 1995
% of plants with more than 20 employees included 
in our sample 85.6% 91.2% 94.5%
% of total employment in plants with more than 
20 employees included in our sample 92.0% 95.7% 98.6%
% of plants with more than 10 employees included 
in our sample 79.8% 84.3% 87.5%
% of total employment in plants with more than 10 
employees included in our sample 89.7% 92.4% 94.7%
% of plants with more than 5 employees included 
in our sample 63.6% 62.9% 62.4%
% of total employment in plants with more than 
5 employees included in our sample 84.9% 87.0% 90.7%11.4.3 Capital
A critical issue in the calculation of total factor productivity (TFP) is
construction of a capital measure. Some researchers avoid analyzing TFP
and instead compute labor productivity (LP), which is easier to measure.
We will present econometric results based on both TFP and LP. We calcu-
lated estimates of the capital stock as follows: initial values of capital were
estimated in 1989, based on the assumption of a constant capital-to-sales
Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital 409
Table 11.5 Incidence of ownership change for 19,010 Swedish manufacturing plants
(1986–1998)
% of plants  % of value-added % of employment 
involved in an  involved in an  involved in an 
Year ownership change ownership change ownership change
1986 3.2% 3.1% 3.3%
1987 4.3% 5.2% 5.7%
1988 5.5% 8.3% 7.5%
1989 5.0% 5.1% 5.6%
1990 4.8% 7.7% 8.2%
1991 4.8% 7.8% 7.4%
1992 5.6% 5.0% 5.7%
1993 6.0% 4.7% 5.2%
1994 4.6% 7.3% 6.7%
1995 3.9% 6.0% 5.3%
1996 3.9% 2.1% 3.1%
1997 3.7% 4.7% 3.8%
1998 3.2% 2.3% 3.0%
Entire period 5.1% 5.4% 5.6%
Table 11.6 Incidence of ownership change for 19,010 Swedish manufacturing plants
(1986–1998) by type of ownership change
% of plants  % of value-added  % of employment 
involved in a  involved in a  involved in a 
particular type of  particular type of  particular type of 
Type of ownership change ownership change ownership change ownership change
All ownership changes 5.1% 5.3% 5.6%
Full acquisition 4.2% 2.7% 3.2%
Partial acquisition 0.9% 2.6% 2.4%
Full divestiture 4.5% 3.3% 3.9%
Partial divestiture 0.7% 2.0% 1.8%
Related acquisition 0.9% 1.2% 1.4%
Unrelated acquisition 0.6% 0.8% 0.6%
Change in ownership involving 
a single ﬁrm 3.7% 3.4% 3.7%ratio across all plants in each two-digit SIC industry. Using these initial
estimates, capital is constructed using the usual perpetual inventory algo-
rithm, Kc
it   (1 –  c)Kc
it–1    tIc
it, where i denotes a plant, t denotes a year, c
is either machinery or buildings and land, K denotes capital, I denotes in-
vestment,   denotes the depreciation rate, and   denotes an investment de-
ﬂator.4 The capital estimates for machinery, plus buildings and land were
summed to create a single combined capital stock measure, Kit.
11.4.4 Employees
Matched employee-level data come from a database on the jobs and
earnings of every employee in Sweden. The data are based on tax ﬁlings
and hence record each employee’s annual earnings, which distinguish year-
long work-related earnings from other earnings.5 Employment is recorded
in November of each year, and the records match employees (with a tiny
percentage of missing cases among our manufacturing employees) to spe-
ciﬁc plants, ﬁrms, and (ﬁve-digit SIC) industries. Because the database
covers all employees as needed for relevant tax records, we are able to in-
fer that any employee whose record is missing in a given year was not 
employed in Sweden in that year. The full database contains 36,398,617
records across the fourteen years of data from 1985 to 1998, for an average
of 2.6 million workers per year, consistent with the Swedish population 
of close to 9 million. Among all of the records, 9,251,962 records pertain
to cases in which a person is employed by a manufacturing plant in our
sample during the relevant year.
The employee data include information on the gender, national origin,
year of birth, most recent year of education, and number of years of edu-
cation for each employee. We use this information to construct measures
at the plant and employee levels of workforce characteristics. At the plant
level, we assess (in each year) the percentage of workers who are male ver-
sus female, the percentage who were born in Sweden versus immigrated,
the mean age of employees, mean years of experience (as proxied by the
number of years elapsed since their last year of education), and the per-
centage of employees with at least some college-level education. At the em-
ployee level, we assess (in each year) the gender of the employee, whether
he or she was born in Sweden, was below or above the mean age, below 
or above the mean level of experience, and determine educational status
based on the following four categories: (a) less than a high school educa-
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4. The depreciation rate for machinery was allowed to diﬀer by three-digit SIC industry and
was taken from ﬁgures of the OECD, while a constant ﬁgure of 0.0314 was used for buildings
and land. Investments were deﬂated using manufacturing sector-wide annual investment de-
ﬂators reported by Statistics Sweden. We rely on ﬁgures kindly provided by M. Carlsson and
replicate and extend the methods he used.
5. The data do not include hours worked or hourly wages, only the employee’s annual total
income from employment.tion (up to ten years apparently equivalent to U.S. grade 8), (b) high school
education (up to fourteen years apparently equivalent to U.S. grade 12), (c)
at least some college or technical school education, and (d) at least some
PhD-level studies. For our analysis of employee turnover in the aftermath
of ownership change (where do old employees go and where do new em-
ployees come from), we also assessed whether employees transitioned to
jobs in the same four-digit SIC industry versus jobs in other manufac-
turing or nonmanufacturing industries, and whether each employee was
working in Sweden in each year.6
11.5 Econometric Models
11.5.1 Types of Models
In this version of the chapter, we estimate two types of models. For
analyses of labor and total factor productivity,
(4) ln Qit   fit    it
where Qit denotes plant i’s output in year t, fit is the logarithm of plant i’s
production function in year t, and  it is an eﬃciency residual. The eﬃ-
ciency residual is assumed to be inﬂuenced by ownership change and other
variables, as follows:
(5)  it  ∑
12
s  13
 sOCit s     xit   εit
where Σ12
s –13 sOCit–sparameterizes the relation to ownership change as dis-
cussed in the following,  is a vector of coeﬃcients, xitis a vector of control
variables for plant i in year t, and εit is the remaining eﬃciency residual.
Rewriting (4) thus yields
(6) ln Qit   fit  ∑
12
s  13
 sOCit s     xit   εit.
Other analyses, which are not based on estimation of a production func-
tion, assume the same form:
(7) yit    ∑
12
s  13
 sOCit s     xit   εit.
where yit is the dependent variable in question (e.g., employment or earn-
ings),   is an intercept parameter, and the other terms are as deﬁned previ-
ously.
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6. Employees’ four-digit SIC industries of employment were assessed using 1969 SICs
where possible, for comparability with the plant-level analyses. However, 1969 SICs were not
available in all years of data, so 1992 SICs were used to assess industry of employment when
1969 SICs were not available in both the year in question and the comparator year.11.5.2 Ownership Change
The treatment of ownership change in the econometric analysis requires
careful consideration. In equations (5) through (7), s denotes the year rel-
ative to the year of ownership change, so that negative values of s signify
years preceding ownership change, s 0 denotes the year during which the
plant changed owners, and positive values of s pertain to years following
ownership change. A dummy variable OCit–s equals 1 if plant i’s owner
changed (with certainty) s years preceding the current year t for s   0, or
|s| years following the current year for s   0, or 0 otherwise. Note that our
sample allows us to identify each plant’s owner for the years 1985 through
1998, so a new owner can be identiﬁed in each year for 1986 through 1998.
For a plant observed in 1985, we wish to know whether an ownership
change will occur for up to thirteen years in the future, while for a plant ob-
served in 1998, we wish to know whether an ownership change occurred up
to twelve years in the past. This consideration of past and future ownership
changes yields a possible range of leads and lags from –13 to  12.
The relation of past and future ownership change to productivity, size,
or workforce characteristics can then be assessed, at each value of s, by in-
cluding in the model the terms Σ12
s –13  sOCit–s, where  s parameterizes the
relation to ownership change at lead/lag s. To avoid model speciﬁcation
bias, each  s is unconstrained and is estimated over the full range of s from
–13 to  12. The ﬁtted terms of  s provide estimates of the relationship of
ownership change to productivity, size, and workforce characteristics in
each year.
10.5.3 Avoiding Biases
If just the ownership change dummies were included as regressors, the es-
timates would be subject to sample selection and measurement error biases.
Sample selection bias would result because for large positive or negative val-
ues of s, the ownership change variable OCit–s equals one only if the plant
survived a large number of years (at least –s   1 years for s   0 or at least 
s 2 years for s 0). Any characteristics of surviving plants, such as higher
productivity, would thus be partially attributed to ownership change.
Measurement error bias would also result, given that ownership changes
are unmeasured when they occur outside the sample time frame. For ex-
ample, for s –13, OCit–scan equal one only if t 1985 (so t– s 1998); for
other values of t information about ownership changes is unavailable (since
t – s   1998, the last year of data), causing, by deﬁnition, OCit–(–13)   0. 
Similarly, for s   –12, OCit–s can equal 1 only if t   1986;...;  f o r  s   –1,
OCit–s can equal 1 only if t   1997; for s   0, OCit–s can equal 1 only if t  
1986;...;  f o r  s   12, OCit–s can equal 1 only if t   1998. If observations
are evenly dispersed across years and the probability of ownership change
remains constant at p over time, the expected value of OCit–s would equal
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s   – 1 2 ,...,   13/14 p for s   –1 or s   0 ,...,   1/14 p for s   12. Thus, val-
ues of OCit–swould constitute error-ridden indicators of ownership change,
with the error greatest for the largest (absolute) values of s. If these owner-
ship change measures are uncorrelated with each other and with all other
regressors, the resulting coeﬃcient estimates would be biased toward zero,
with the greatest bias for estimates at large (absolute) values of s. If the true
coeﬃcients all equaled the same constant number c, the expected values of
the estimates would follow a U-shape (if c   0) or inverted U-shape (if c  
0). Hence, both sample selection and measurement biases could confound
our analysis of the relationship between ownership change and plant per-
formance.
Such biases can be especially severe when researchers use a balanced
panel (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel 1987), restrict the range of s(McGuckin
and Nguyen 1995), or analyze pre- versus post-acquisition periods using a
single coeﬃcient for each. For example, the use of a balanced panel im-
parts a strong selection bias because the analysis is based only on those
plants that survived throughout the sample period. Restrictions on the
range of s eﬀectively constrain  s to equal zero outside of the range, yield-
ing possible speciﬁcation error. Pre- versus post-acquisition periods eﬀec-
tively constrain  s to be identical across values of s and hence constitute 
an additional source of speciﬁcation error. Moreover, none of these ap-
proaches entirely gets rid of the sample selection and measurement biases
pointed out previously unless all data points are dropped from analysis if
they are within L 1 years of the start and Lyears of the end of the sample
and the range of s is constrained to –L   s   L.
There is a simple way to address this problem without excluding any ob-
servations. The intended comparison is between plants that experienced
ownership change in year t – s and those that could have but did not expe-
rience ownership change in year t – s (not between plants that did experi-
ence, versus those that might have or could not have experienced, owner-
ship change). For each s, we divide the observations into three types of
establishments: (a) plants that did experience ownership change in year t– s,
(b) plants that could have but did not experience ownership change in year
t – s, and (c) plants that did not exist or those for which it is unknown
whether they experienced ownership change in year t– s. To ensure that the
coeﬃcients  s describe the diﬀerence between categories (a) and (b), it is
suﬃcient to introduce into the model a dummy variable NDit–s that equals
1 for any observations meeting condition (c) in year t – s and 0 for all other
observations. This gives rise to one additional variable for each s, yielding
the sum Σ12
s –13 1sNDit–s, comparable to the ownership change term in the
models. NDit–s   1 implies either no data about whether ownership change
occurred in year t – s, or nonexistence of the plant in year t – s. These con-
trols remove a potentially important source of bias in the estimates.
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application of the use of dummy variables in regression models. A re-
searcher with data on the earnings of Asian, black, and white workers
could compare the mean earnings of Asians and blacks by regressing earn-
ings on 0 – 1 dummies for black and white workers and then examining the
estimated coeﬃcient on the black dummy. Were the researcher to omit the
white dummy variable and include only the black dummy variable, the es-
timated coeﬃcient of black would no longer yield an unbiased estimate of
the black-minus-Asian earnings diﬀerence (it would be unbiased only if
Asians and whites had equal expected earnings). Letting A, B, and W de-
note the mean earnings of these three groups, the estimated coeﬃcient of
black converges to B – A in the ﬁrst regression but B – [hA   (1 – h)W] in
the second regression, where h is the proportion of Asians among all
Asians plus whites in the sampled population.
The use of dummy variables is analogous here: for each s replace Asians
with No Change in Owner s years ago, replace blacks with Change in
Owner s years ago, and replace whites with Don’t Know whether Owner-
ship Change Occurred s years ago, and let A, B, and W denote for these
three groups the mean of the dependent variable after subtracting the
eﬀects of all other independent variables. The dummy variables used for
the latter two groups are OCit–sand NDit–s. Were a researcher to omit NDit–s
from a regression, the estimated coeﬃcient of OCit–swould converge not to
the diﬀerence between ﬁrms with versus without ownership change, but to
B – [hA   (1 – h)W ], where h is the proportion of No Change in Owner s
years ago cases among the total of No Change in Owner s years ago cases
plus Don’t Know whether Ownership Change Occurred s years ago cases
in the sampled population. Indeed, in simulations we have found substan-
tial bias without the NDit–s controls, but no bias once they are introduced.
To reduce another possible bias, caused by cross-industry, cross-year, or
cross-plant-age diﬀerences in both the probability of acquisition and the
dependent variable (or productivity), additional controls are used. Fixed
eﬀect dummies are included in all analyses for each year, four-digit indus-
try (according to 1969 Swedish SICs), and plant age.7 In addition, produc-
tion function parameters are each allowed to diﬀer by industry, eﬀectively,
by including interaction terms that equal industry-speciﬁc dummies (Ikit 
1 if plant i’s primary industry is equal to k or Ikit   0 otherwise) times each
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7. Industries must be deﬁned according to 1969 industries because only in the later years of
the sample have plants been classiﬁed according to more recent industry deﬁnitions. Another
limitation of the data is that they do not include plant ages, so plants are classiﬁed according
to their minimum age (1 , 2 , . . .) if they existed in 1985 or their actual age if they entered
after 1985. Fortunately, the employee-level data ﬁle indicated (for nearly all plants) whether
each plant existed in each year, even if it was not present in the plant-level data; these addi-
tional data therefore allowed identiﬁcation of plant age without sample selection in years
1985 to 1998.production function parameter.8 Use of these controls implies that the re-
lations of ownership change are studied largely for plants of comparable
industry and age at a comparable date.
11.5.4 Endogeneity and Descriptive Estimation
It is common in the estimation of production functions to use instru-
mental variables to ensure consistent parameter estimates despite possible
endogeneity. In our context, ownership change may be endogenous, since
some theories conjecture that the sale of a plant or ﬁrm may be more likely
when it has relatively low productivity. Just as instrumental variables meth-
ods can be used to estimate a supply or demand equation rather than a mix-
ture of the two, such techniques could be used in an analysis of the conse-
quences of ownership change.
In this chapter, however, our aim is not to estimate either causes or con-
sequences, but merely to describe patterns experienced on average before
and after plants undergo ownership change. We focus on describing trends
in several key variables before and after ownership change.9
10.6 Empirical Results
10.6.1 Descriptive Statistics for Plant-Level Variables
Table 11.7 contains descriptive statistics for key variables used in the
econometric analysis, presented separately for plants that experienced an
ownership change and for those that did not. Plants involved in these trans-
actions tend to be larger by about 60 percent.10 On average, they employed
slightly smaller percentages of female workers and workers with at least a
college education, and slightly more non-Swedish employees than plants
that did not experience an ownership change.
11.6.2 Productivity, Output, and Employment 
as Related to Ownership Change
We now consider changes in productivity and plant size associated with
ownership change. Table 11.8 presents OLS estimates of four equations: la-
bor productivity, total factor productivity, output, and employment. The
equations we estimate are the following.
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8. We also experimented with including detailed geographic region dummies in the TFP
equation, and found that their inclusion had almost no eﬀect on our results.
9. The focus on observed empirical patterns matches the descriptive focus of the NBER
conference for which this paper was developed, and accords with the wishes of the conference
organizers.
10. The 60 percent greater size of plants experiencing ownership change than those not ex-
periencing ownership change can be computed as exp(9.98 – 9.51)   1.6.Labor Productivity:
(14) ln(Qijt)    jt    1j ln(Lijt)  ∑
12
s  13




  Age Dummies   Industry Dummies   Time Dummies   εijt
Total Factor Productivity:




 sOCijt s  ∑
12
s  13
 sNDijt s   Age Dummies 
  Industry Dummies   Time Dummies   εijt
Output or Employment:
(16) yijt    jt  ∑
12
s  13
 sOCijt s  ∑
12
s  13
 sNDijt s   Age Dummies 
  Industry Dummies   Time Dummies   εijt
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Table 11.7 Means and standard deviations of production function variables and
worker characteristics
Plants that  Plants that do 
experience an  not experience an 
Variable All plants ownership change ownership change
Log gross output 9.68 9.98 9.51
(1.52) (1.55) (1.51)
Log real value of plant and  9.21 9.60 9.01
machinery capital stock (1.49) (1.41) (1.48)
Log plant employment 3.36 3.67 3.18
(1.21) (1.22) (1.17)
Log materials 8.80 9.18 8.59
(1.82) (1.75) (1.82)
Average age of employees 39.49 39.57 39.45
(5.36) (4.95) (5.56)
Percentage of female employees 25.77 25.18 26.08
(21.64) (20.61) (22.17)
Percentage of non-Swedish  9.24 9.62 9.04
employees (11.49) (11.17) (11.66)
Percentage of employees with  2.81 2.45 3.00
at least a college education (7.11) (5.85) (7.68)
Log earnings 11.86 11.85 11.86
(0.37) (0.36) (0.38)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.Table 11.8 Parameter estimates from labor productivity, total factor productivity,
output, and employment regressions for all ownership changes
Labor TFP 
Coeﬃcient on: productivity (Cobb-Douglas) Output Employment
Labora 1.054∗∗∗∗ .375∗∗∗∗
(0.014) (.014) — —
Capitala — .270∗∗∗∗
— (.018) — —
Materialsa .347∗∗∗∗
— (.014) — —
OCt 13 –0.52 .092 .162∗
(.035) — (.093) (.085)
OCt 12 –.042∗ .020 .058
(.025) — (.060) (.052)
OCt 11 –.010 .049 .055
(.020) — (.045) (.040)
OCt 10 –.027∗ .060 .083∗∗
(.017) — (.039) (.035)
OCt 9 –.036∗∗ .009 .114∗∗∗∗ .142∗∗∗∗
(.015) (.018) (.035) (.032)
OCt 8 –.035∗∗∗∗ .012 .136∗∗∗∗ .163∗∗∗∗
(.013) (.011) (.029) (.026)
OCt 7 –.039∗∗∗∗ .011 .162∗∗∗∗ .191∗∗∗∗
(.011) (.011) (.026) (.023)
OCt 6 –.041∗∗∗∗ –.018∗∗ .186∗∗∗∗ .216∗∗∗∗
(.010) (.008) (.023) (.020)
OCt 5 –.041∗∗∗∗ –.031∗∗∗∗ .205∗∗∗∗ .232∗∗∗∗
(.010) (.008) (.022) (.019)
OCt 4 –.041∗∗∗∗ –.028∗∗∗∗ .179∗∗∗∗ .208∗∗∗∗
(.009) (.006) (.020) (.017)
OCt 3 –.042∗∗∗∗ –.039∗∗∗∗ .178∗∗∗∗ .208∗∗∗∗
(.009) (.006) (.019) (.016)
OCt 2 –.035∗∗∗∗ –.036∗∗∗∗ .179∗∗∗∗ .202∗∗∗∗
(.008) (.005) (.018) (.015)
OCt 1 –.050∗∗∗∗ –.056∗∗∗∗ .153∗∗∗∗ .195∗∗∗∗
(.009) (.006) (.018) (.015)
OCt 0 –.022∗∗∗ –.066∗∗∗∗ –.001 .022∗∗∗∗
(.008) (.006) (.017) (.015)
OCt–1 –.009 –.032∗∗∗∗ .082∗∗∗∗ .086∗∗∗∗
(.008) (.005) (.018) (.015)
OCt–2 –.004 –.024∗∗∗∗ .092∗∗∗∗ .087∗∗∗∗
(.009) (.005) (.019) (.016)
OCt–3 .002 –.013∗∗ .101∗∗∗∗ .092∗∗∗∗
(.010) (.006) (.021) (.018)
OCt–4 .002 –.020∗∗∗ .095∗∗∗∗ .088∗∗∗∗
(.010) (.006) (.023) (.019)
OCt–5 .005 –.014∗∗ .097∗∗∗∗ .090∗∗∗∗
(.011) (.007) (.025) (.021)
OCt–6 .019 –.006 .142∗∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗∗
(.012) (.007) (.028) (.024)
(continued)where Lijt, Kijt, and Mijt are labor, capital, and materials for plant i in in-
dustry j at year t, OCijt–s and NDijt–s are the ownership change and no-data
dummy variables described earlier, and yijt is output or employment for
plant iin industry jat year t.11Recall that each regression is estimated with
detailed industry level (four-digit SIC) ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, the coeﬃcients
on the nonownership change variables (labor, capital, and materials) are
weighted means of industry-speciﬁc coeﬃcients.
The coeﬃcients on labor, capital, and materials in the two productivity
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11. The equations deliberately do not include plant ﬁxed eﬀects, only industry ﬁxed eﬀects,
because including plant ﬁxed eﬀects would make it impossible to observe whether plants that
experience ownership change tend to have persistently low or high productivity or, indeed, to
know how these plants compare to their industry (and age and time) averages at all—all pat-
terns that are important to be able to detect.
OCt–7 .043∗∗∗ .017∗∗ .187∗∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗∗
(.014) (.008) (.033) (.027)
OCt–8 .030∗ .009 .159∗∗∗∗ .119∗∗∗∗
(.013) (.011) (.037) (.030)
OCt–9 .037∗∗ .021∗ .139∗∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗∗
(.018) (.012) (.041) (.034)
OCt–10 .040∗ .024∗ .175∗∗∗∗ .124∗∗∗∗
(.022) (.014) (.050) (.041)
OCt–11 .061∗∗ .046∗∗ .201∗∗∗∗ .121∗∗∗
(.030) (.021) (.069) (.057)
OCt–12 .024 .028 .171∗∗∗∗ .104
(.054) (.038) (.108) (.091)
“No-data” dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 6.150∗∗∗∗ 2.084∗∗∗∗ 10.610∗∗∗∗ 4.049∗∗∗∗
(0.053) (.143) (.059) (.049)
R2 0.859 0.960 0.358 0.301
Number of plants 18,495 15,946 18,513 18,962
Number of observations 124,381 82,307 124,441 125,416
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are two-tailed using robust standard
errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.
a Weighted means of industry-speciﬁc coeﬃcients at the detailed (four-digit SIC) industry
level.
∗∗∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1 percent level.
∗∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
Table 11.8 (continued)
Labor TFP 
Coeﬃcient on: productivity (Cobb-Douglas) Output Employmentmodels appear to be plausible. They are reasonably close to their respec-
tive factor shares and strongly suggestive of constant returns to scale. The
total factor productivity (TFP) equation is estimated for a restricted
sample of plants and years, because the capital measure is only available
from 1989 onward and, in those years, for 92.3 percent of plants.
Next, we focus our attention on the coeﬃcients on the ownership change
dummies in table 11.8. For example, the value –.042 for the estimated co-
eﬃcient of OC–1 in the labor productivity equation signiﬁes that plants ex-
periencing an ownership change one year hence were 4.2 percent less pro-
ductive, on average, than comparable establishments that did not change
owners. Note that while the relative performance of plants changing own-
ers was signiﬁcantly worse before the transaction, relative eﬃciency ap-
pears to have improved after the ownership change, as these establishments
converged to the average level of industry performance. The LP estimates
indicate lower than average productivity before ownership change, fol-
lowed by a rapid increase to the industry norm, and ultimately, higher pro-
ductivity following the ownership change. The TFP estimates indicate pro-
ductivity steadily deteriorating to a low of nearly 6 percent below average,
followed by a steady return to average and higher productivity after the
ownership change. The decline in TFP, but not LP, in the ﬁve years pre-
ceding ownership change implies that while labor was used ineﬃciently in
these plants, it was in the application of equipment and materials that they
experienced a gradual eﬃciency decline.12
The output and employment results, which are presented in the last two
columns of table 11.8, help explain the productivity increase. Plants that
changed owners apparently had higher output and employment than com-
parable plants both before and after ownership change. They reduced both
output and employment after an ownership change.13 However, employ-
ment declined at a faster rate than output, which resulted in a productivity
increase.
In table 11.9, we present averages of the coeﬃcients on the ownership
change dummies in the LP, TFP, output, and employment equations for
ﬁve years before and ﬁve years after the transaction (we exclude year zero,
which is the year of the acquisition). In the third row of each panel, we
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12. The TFP results are based on a subsample of observations, since capital stock measures
are unavailable before 1989. However, this is not the source of the diﬀerence between the LP
and TFP results. Estimating the LP equation using the same subsample of observations as for
the TFP regression yields nearly identical results to those reported for LP in the chapter.
13. Although the change in output could result either from a decision on the part of the new
owners or a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock that triggers ownership change, there is some evidence that
the output reductions may in fact result from the decisions of the new management. First,
similar declines in output do not coincide with the gradual reduction in productivity that pre-
cedes ownership change. Second, the same decline in output and employment are apparent
after adding industry-year interactions to the model using four-digit SIC codes, thereby con-
trolling for possible industry-speciﬁc demand shocks. This leaves open the possibility of other
shocks that lead to ownership change and also to downsizing.Table 11.9 Estimated eﬀects of ownership change on labor productivity (LP), total
factor productivity (TFP), output, and employment for various types of
ownership changes
Period LP TFP Output Employment
All ownership changes
Pre-ownership change –0.042∗∗∗∗ –0.038∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change –0.001 –0.021∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗∗
Post-pre 0.041∗∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ –0.086∗∗∗∗ –0.120∗∗∗∗
Full acquisitions
Pre-ownership change –0.055∗∗∗∗ –0.038∗∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change –0.007 –0.024∗∗∗∗ –0.055∗∗∗ –0.046∗∗∗
Post-pre 0.047∗∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ –0.116∗∗∗∗ –0.156∗∗∗∗
Partial acquisitions
Pre-ownership change 0.011 –0.037∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change 0.019 –0.011 0.556∗∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗∗
Post-pre 0.008 0.026∗ –0.076∗∗ –0.073∗∗
Full divestitures
Pre-ownership change –0.052∗∗∗∗ –0.039∗∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change –0.005 –0.022∗∗∗∗ –0.012 –0.007
Post-pre 0.047∗∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ –0.104∗∗∗∗ –0.144∗∗∗∗
Partial divestitures
Pre-ownership change 0.019 –0.030∗ 0.684∗∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change 0.018 –0.014 0.594∗∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗∗
Post-pre –0.001 0.015∗ –0.090∗∗ –0.077∗∗
Related acquisitions
Pre-ownership change 0.005 –0.043∗∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change 0.021 –0.009 0.363∗∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗∗
Post-pre 0.015 0.034∗∗ –0.066∗ –0.079∗∗
Unrelated acquisitions
Pre-ownership change –0.013 –0.034∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change 0.020 –0.010 0.234∗∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗∗
Post-pre 0.033∗∗ 0.024 –0.111∗ –0.138∗∗∗
Change in ownership involving a single ﬁrm
Pre-ownership change –0.059∗∗∗∗ –0.037∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change –0.007 –0.024∗∗∗ 0.014 0.020
Post-pre 0.052∗∗∗∗ 0.013∗ –0.075∗∗∗∗ –0.118∗∗∗∗
Notes: Pre-ownership change is average 5 years before; post-ownership change is average 5
years after. Signiﬁcance levels are two-tailed using robust standard errors, allowing for corre-
lated (“clustered”) errors within plants.
∗∗∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1 percent level.
∗∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.report the growth in the average coeﬃcient from the ﬁve years before to the
ﬁve years after ownership change, and we formally test whether the post-
versus pre-ownership change eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant. Our ﬁnd-
ings are also presented separately in table 11.9 for various types of owner-
ship change: full acquisitions and partial acquisitions, full divestitures 
and partial divestitures, related acquisitions, unrelated acquisitions, and
changes in ownership involving a single ﬁrm.
The “post-pre” results in the ﬁrst panel of table 11.9 conﬁrm our earlier
ﬁnding that plants involved in an ownership change became more produc-
tive after the transaction. From the ﬁve years before to the ﬁve years after
ownership change, LP is estimated to have increased by 4.1 percent (p  
.001) and TFP by 1.7 percent (p   .01). We also ﬁnd that output and em-
ployment were reduced after ownership change, with employment declin-
ing more than output. Output is estimated to have declined by 8.6 percent
(p   .001) from the pre- to post-ownership change ﬁve-year periods, and
employment is estimated to have decreased by 12.0 percent (p   .001).
The growth in LP is estimated to have been much higher for full acquisi-
tions and divestitures than for partial acquisitions and divestitures (panels
2 through 5 of table 11.9). In full-ﬁrm acquisitions and divestitures both,
labor productivity grew an estimated 4.7 percent between the two ﬁve-year
periods (both p < .001). In contrast, partial acquisitions were associated
with only 0.8 percent growth in LP, while partial divestitures were associ-
ated with a decrease of 0.1 percent in LP (both changes are insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero). The diﬀerence may stem from the fact that plants ac-
quired through partial acquisition and divestiture had higher labor pro-
ductivity to begin with, 1.1 percent above the norm for partial acquisitions
and 1.9 percent above the norm for partial divestitures, versus labor pro-
ductivity averaging 5.5 percent below the industry norm for full acquisi-
tions and 5.2 percent below the industry norm for partial divestitures.14
Growth in TFP was much more similar across full versus partial acqui-
sitions and divestitures. Partial acquisitions are estimated to have experi-
enced slightly higher (2.6 percent) TFP growth between the two ﬁve-year
periods than either full acquisitions (1.4 percent) or any type of divestiture
(1.5 percent to 1.7 percent), but the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant. All types of acquisitions and divestitures involved plants whose TFP
was about 3.0 percent to 3.9 percent below the norm before ownership
change.
Labor Productivity (LP) grew more in the aftermath of unrelated acqui-
sitions, as opposed to related acquisitions, and even more in ownership
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14. These diﬀerences pre-ownership change might stem from higher labor productivity in
larger plants or from cherry-picking by acquiring ﬁrms that purchase only some of a ﬁrm’s
plants.changes that did not involve a second (manufacturing) ﬁrm. Among these
three types of ownership change, the increase in labor productivity was
negatively related to initial productivity: single-ﬁrm ownership changes in-
creased their LP an estimated 5.2 percent (p   .001) from 5.9 percent be-
low the norm to 0.7 percent below the norm, while unrelated acquisitions
saw LP increase an estimated 3.3 percent (p   .05) from 1.3 percent below
the norm to 2.0 percent above the norm, and related acquisitions saw LP
increase only an estimated 1.5 percent (statistically insigniﬁcant) from 0.5
percent above the norm to 2.1 percent above the norm. Total Factor Pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth was substantial and signiﬁcant, but was greatest
for related acquisitions, with 3.4 percent growth (p   .05) from an initial
base 4.3 percent below the norm, whereas the unrelated and single-ﬁrm
ownership changes, respectively, experienced only 2.4 percent (insigniﬁ-
cant) and 1.3 percent (p   .10) TFP growth from initial bases 3.4 percent
and 3.7 percent below the norm. The ﬁnding that unrelated acquisitions
enhanced plant productivity is consistent with U.S. evidence presented in
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Schoar (2002).
The decline in output, and especially employment, was greatest in the af-
termath of full acquisitions and divestitures, for which output declined
11.6 percent (p   .001) and 10.4 percent (p   .001), respectively, and em-
ployment declined 15.6 percent (p   .001) and 14.4 percent (p   .001) re-
spectively. In contrast, partial acquisitions and divestitures respectively ex-
perienced an estimated 7.6 percent (p   .05) and 9.0 percent (p   .05)
decline in output and 7.3 percent (p .05) and 7.7 percent (p .05) decline
in employment. Partial acquisitions and divestitures tended to involve
plants that were substantially larger to begin with, starting larger than the
norm by an estimated 63.3 percent and 68.4 percent, respectively, versus
only 6.1 percent and 9.2 percent for full acquisitions and divestitures. The
declines in output and employment are estimated to have been greater for
unrelated acquisitions than for related acquisitions, but there is no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the related and unrelated (and single-
ﬁrm) acquisitions.
Both the annual coeﬃcient estimates and the ﬁve-year means for all
ownership changes combined are shown graphically in ﬁgures 11.1
through 11.4.These graphs make it easy to visualize the relation of the four
variables to ownership change, and moreover, clarify annual patterns that
are not evident in the ﬁve-year means. The horizontal axis in each graph
spans a ﬁfteen-year period, from seven years before ownership change to
seven years after ownership change. The vertical axis corresponds to the
values of the estimated coeﬃcients, and hence to the relation of ownership
change to productivity, output, or employment at a given time relative to
the year of ownership change. The curve drawn across the diagram shows
the annually changing values of productivity relative to the industry (and
age and year) norm. For each coeﬃcient estimate, its 95 percent conﬁdence
422 Donald S. Siegel, Kenneth L. Simons, and Tomas LindstromFig. 11.1 Graphs of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the 
LP equation
Fig. 11.2 Graphs of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the 
TFP equationFig. 11.3 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the output
equation
Fig. 11.4 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the em-
ployment equationband clariﬁes the range of error in the estimates. Dashed lines in the ﬁve
years pre- and post-ownership change indicate 95 percent conﬁdence
bands for means before and after ownership change, and a 95 percent band
drawn at year zero pertains to the change between the ﬁve-year periods
pre- to post-ownership change.
The graphs demonstrate that ﬁve-year averages can mask important dy-
namics related to the time of ownership change. For labor productivity, the
ﬁve-year means provide an accurate summary, but for TFP, they hide a
substantial and statistically signiﬁcant decline in productivity up to the
time of ownership change, followed by substantial growth in productivity
that begins immediately after the year of ownership change. The pattern in-
deed looks as if typical plants had been losing TFP relative to the norm at
a pace of about 1 percent per year before ownership change, with the new
owners apparently managing to enhance productivity by about 4 percent
within one year after ownership change and continuing to enhance pro-
ductivity by about 0.5 percent per year thereafter.
The graphs for real output and employment also indicate substantial
disruptions in the year of ownership change, with plants formerly about 15
percent above the norm in output and 20 percent above the norm in em-
ployment suddenly falling to levels near their industry (and age and year)
means. Under the new ownership, output (especially) and employment
(somewhat) then grew immediately in the year following ownership
change, with very slow increases in subsequent years.
11.6.3 Labor Force Characteristics as Related to Ownership Change
In table 11.10, we present similar results for six labor-related dependent
variables: the average age of employees at the plant, average experience, the
percentage of female employees, the percentage of non-Swedish employees,
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Table 11.10 Estimated eﬀects of ownership change on age, experience, % female, 
% non-Swedish, % college-educated, and earnings
% %  %  College-
Period Age Experience Female Non-Swedish educated Earnings
Pre-ownership change  0.053 0.046 0.766∗∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗ –0.051 –0.009∗∗∗∗
Post-ownership change  0.213∗∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗∗ 0.117 0.245 0.126 0.004∗
Post-pre 0.160∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ –0.649∗∗∗ –0.114 0.177∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗∗
Notes: Pre-ownership change is average 5 years before; post-ownership change is average 5 years after.
Signiﬁcance levels are two-tailed using robust standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) er-
rors within plants.
∗∗∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1 percent level.
∗∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.the percentage of college-educated workers, and earnings. As before, the
table includes estimates for the various types of ownership change. Figures
11.5 through 11.10 present graphical representations of the annual coeﬃ-
cient estimates for all ownership changes.
The ﬁndings in table 11.10 imply that plants involved in ownership change
experienced estimated increases in average employee age by 0.16 year or
about two months of age (p .05), in experience by 0.17 year (p .01), and
in the percentage of employees with a college education by (an absolute
amount of) 0.18 percent (p   .05). The age and experience results suggest
some tendency for newer workers to be laid oﬀ or leave more often than
older workers. The education result suggests that ownership change led to
a reduction in the demand for less-educated workers. We also ﬁnd that
ownership change resulted in an increase in employees’ mean earnings (as
always, relative to the industry and plant age and year norm) by 1.3 percent
(p .001) and a decline in the percentage of female workers by (an absolute
amount of) 0.65 percent (p   .01). The increase in earnings is consistent
with more experienced employees remaining, while newer workers left,
since (as the employee-level data conﬁrm) the older and more experienced
workers received higher earnings. The decline in the percentage of female
workers might have been related to women workers often having shorter
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Fig. 11.5 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the mean
employee age equationFig. 11.6 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the mean
employee experience equation
Fig. 11.7 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the per-
centage female workers equationFig. 11.8 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the per-
centage of non-Swedish workers equation
Fig. 11.9 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the per-
centage of college-educated workers equationjob durations than men, and hence being more likely to lose a job because
of short job tenure and experience.
The annual estimated coeﬃcients in ﬁgures 11.5 through 11.10 reaﬃrm
the previous conclusions, but suggest that at least some of the estimated
changes were gradual processes. In particular, mean employee age and ex-
perience increased gradually, and the percentage of female workers de-
clined gradually over a period of several years following ownership change.
There are multiple possible interpretations of these patterns, but one inter-
pretation involves employees not fully losing their connection with a plant
even if they were laid oﬀ temporarily during the year of ownership change,
and the new owners often gradually shifting to a workforce that suits their
demands.
Two additional stylized facts emerge from these ﬁgures. The percentage
of college-educated workers may actually have increased in the year before
ownership change, although the ranges of error involved leave some un-
certainty in this conclusion. Also, earnings plummeted (signiﬁcantly) rela-
tive to the norm in the year preceding ownership change. This decline in
earnings is explained by a reduction in hours worked per employee, which
fell below the norm by 3.2 percent in the year preceding ownership change
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Fig. 11.10 Graph of the coeﬃcients on the ownership change dummies in the mean
earnings equationand 1.3 percent in the year of ownership change, but in other years was
close to the norm in plants that experienced ownership change.15
11.6.4 Where Pre-Ownership Change Employees Went
Next, we make use of the individual-level data, in order to track the
movement and relative compensation of workers whose establishments
were involved in an ownership change. In doing so, we attempt to answer
two questions: (a) where did the old employees go? and (b) where did the
new employees come from?
Table 11.11 presents statistics on the destination (if any) of employees
whose plants experienced ownership change. The top panel of table 11.11
pertains to all employees who left their plant, while the second panel per-
tains to all employees. Each panel indicates the percentage of employees
who had the following characteristics: female, non-Swedish born, age above
the mean of all manufacturing employees, experience above the mean of all
manufacturing employees, and three categories of educational achieve-
ment (less than high school, at least some high school, and at least some
college-level study). The bottom panels of the table show the correspon-
ding sample sizes for employees who left their plant and for all employees.16
The last column is the base case, pertaining to employees whose plants
did not change owner in the subsequent year. In this and other columns in
the table, observations in which ownership change occurred in the previous
or following year are excluded to avoid contaminating data in nearby
years. Also, the observations considered are all employee-year combina-
tions for whom their plant meets the required categorization regarding the
type of ownership change it was about to experience.
Table 11.11 conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the plant-level analyses, concerning
which types of employees were most likely to leave in the wake of an own-
ership change. For example, in plants experiencing ownership change,
27.45 percent of employees were female and 14.23 percent were non-
Swedish born. Because a slightly higher prevalence of females, 28.07 per-
cent, and non-Swedish born, 15.28 percent, occurred among leaving em-
ployees, the percentages of female and non-Swedish born employees was
driven down slightly, consistent with the slight decreases observed in the
preceding regressions. Similarly, the table shows a disproportionately low
percentage of older and more experienced employees leaving plants that
experienced ownership change.
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15. This ﬁnding stems from a regression, like those presented in the chapter, in which the
dependent variable is the logarithm of the average number of hours worked per employee at
the plant. In other years relative to ownership change, the coeﬃcients of the ownership
change dummies in this regression are near zero and are statistically insigniﬁcant at the .05
level.
16. Because the years of experience and education level variables are not available for some
employees, sample sizes are also reported for the number of employees for whom values of
these variables are available.The individual-level results qualify the plant-level results presented ear-
lier. Table 11.11 reveals that even among plants that did not experience
ownership, relatively high percentages of women and non-Swedish born
employees left the plants. Thus, while ownership change may have resulted
in substantial job loss for these workers, it appears as though they were not
treated more unfairly in plants experiencing ownership change than in rep-
resentative plants (in fact, the evidence suggests they were treated slightly
more fairly, perhaps because of diﬀering job roles).17
In tables 11.12 and 11.13, we follow workers at the end of year T – 1 and
measure their employment status and earnings growth, respectively, at the
end of year T   1, cross-classiﬁed by a set of dummy variables denoting
whether the plant that employed them during year T – 1 experienced an
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17. Some care must be taken in comparing ﬁndings at the plant and employee levels not
only because of the complexity of deciphering the ﬂows of employees, but also because the
plant-level analyses control for industry, plant age, and year eﬀects while the employee-level
results simply present outcomes for average employees.
Table 11.11 Employees leaving plants in the aftermath of an ownership change:
Statistics for workers at year T – 1 whose plants experienced an
ownership change during year T
All ownership  No ownership
Employee type changes change
Employees leaving plants:
% Female 28.07 28.50
% Non-Swedish 15.28 14.12
% Age above mean 45.35 39.15
% Experience above mean 40.04 36.45
% Education less than high school 38.75 37.30
% Education to high school 47.82 48.91
% Education some college 13.43 13.79
All employees:
% Female 27.45 26.38
% Non-Swedish 14.23 12.60
% Age above mean 49.12 47.81
% Experience above mean 49.72 50.98
% Education less than high school 41.00 39.40
% Education to high school 47.35 48.27
% Education some college 11.64 12.33
Sample size for employees leaving plant:
All 131,495 1,782,949
With experience data 52,952 802,542
With education data 125,363 1,699,355
Sample size for all employees:
All 352,094 6,586,368
With experience data 135,380 2,690,062
With education data 338,494 6,358,300ownership change during year T.18 In each table, the top panel pertains to
employees whose plants experienced ownership change, while the bottom
panel pertains to the comparator case of no ownership change. Within
each panel, rows pertain to employees’ future job status—workers could
be employed at the same plant, at another plant owned by the previous
owner, at another plant owned by the new owner, at another ﬁrm in the
same industry, at another ﬁrm in a diﬀerent industry, in an unknown in-
dustry or plant (which likely includes workers who become self-employed
or who are employed at an entrepreneurial startup), or they could be un-
employed.
The ﬁndings in table 11.12 are consistent with the plant-level results
cited earlier, in the sense that ownership change appears to have been as-
sociated with an increase in worker turnover at plants and ﬁrms. For ex-
ample, only 62.7 percent of the workers observed at the end of year T – 1
whose plants changed owners during year Twere still employed at the same
establishment at the end of year T   1. Turnover ﬁndings are also pre-
sented separately for diﬀerent types of workers. Not surprisingly, these re-
sults imply that females, non-Swedes, younger employees, and less experi-
enced workers were less likely than representative workers to remain at the
same plant in the aftermath of an ownership change. We also ﬁnd that
workers with the highest levels of education had the greatest mobility
across ﬁrms.
Two-year mean earnings growth for the same groups of workers is pre-
sented in table 11.13. A potentially interesting ﬁnding pertains to women’s
salary growth compared to the norm. Regardless whether ownership
change occurred, females who remained in the same establishment had
higher average earnings growth than males, presumably because they
switched more frequently from part-year to full-year (or part-time to full-
time) employment. The potentially interesting pattern is that women who
remained working in an establishment involved in an ownership change ex-
perienced less earnings growth relative to the norm of no ownership change
(in both absolute and percentage terms) than men. It is important to note,
however, that we do not have individual-speciﬁc information on hours
worked. Thus, one explanation for this ﬁnding, which cannot be ruled out
on the basis of our empirical analysis, is that women (who may relatively
often have worked part-time) may have worked more hours in the after-
math of an ownership change.
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18. The focus on years T – 1 and T   1, rather than times separated by only one year, is ne-
cessitated by the timing of when ownership changes occur and when employee information is
reported. Recall that employee information pertains to November, while ownership change
can occur at any time during the reporting year. If years T – 1 and T were used, it would be
possible that ownership change could have occurred after the employee data were received in
year T (not to mention that new owners’ policies may take some time to come into eﬀect). If
years T and T   1 were used, the employee’s initial status normally would be recorded after













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.It is not only women who experienced this relative wage growth disad-
vantage associated with ownership change. Similarly, earnings growth rel-
ative to the norm was lower for non-Swedish born and younger employees,
compared to Swedish born and older employees, who remained at the es-
tablishment.
We also ﬁnd that more experienced employees had lower earnings
growth relative to the norm than did less experienced workers. Employees
with at least a college education were the only group of staying employees
to experience higher earnings growth with ownership change than without.
Again, perhaps surprisingly, employees without a high-school education
experienced higher earnings growth relative to the norm than those with a
high-school education. These results should be interpreted with caution,
since they may be inﬂuenced by shifts in work hour patterns. They also re-
ﬂect diverse percentages of staying employees and are derived from aggre-
gate statistics.
Earnings growth was low, relative to the norm, for employees who left an
establishment that experienced ownership change. For example, employ-
ees who moved to another ﬁrm in the same industry had only 17.6 percent
average wage growth if they began in ownership change establishments,
versus 25.6 percent average wage growth if they began in establishments
that did not experience ownership change. The diﬀerence may reﬂect lower
average human capital among leaving employees as well as possible diﬃ-
culties of job changes triggered by ownership change.
11.6.5 New Hires by Plants That Experienced an Ownership Change
Table 11.14 contains descriptive statistics on workers at plants that re-
cently experienced an ownership change. Consistent with the format of
table 11.11, we present percentages by employee type for employees hired
by plants during the previous year (new hires) in the top panel, followed by
the same percentages for all workers employed at these establishments in
the second panel. Note that these ﬁgures once again are presented sepa-
rately for plants involved in an ownership change and those that did not ex-
perience such an event.
The evidence in the top panel implies substantial diﬀerences between
these two types of plants, in terms of the kind and fraction of workers they
hired. These substantial diﬀerences existed despite only small diﬀerences
(second panel) in the composition of the workforce between ownership
change and no ownership change plants. Plants that recently experienced
an ownership change more often hired older, more experienced, and less
educated workers. Also, these ﬁndings, in conjunction with the results in
table 11.11 on the characteristics of employees who leave plants (we do not
use the term ﬁred as we cannot distinguish between voluntary and invol-
untary actions), suggest that job turnover was higher in ownership change
establishments, especially for these types of workers.
Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital 435In table 11.15, we reverse the analysis of table 11.12 by identifying work-
ers at the end of year T   1 and then determining their employment status
at the end of year T– 1. The results presented in table 11.15 imply that plants
involved in an ownership change were more likely to hire new workers than
plants that did not experience these transactions. There is also an element
of consistency with the regression results presented earlier, which indicated
that ownership change was associated with downsizing of the workforce.
That is, while three quarters of workers (75.8 percent) at plants not experi-
encing an ownership change were still employed at the same plant, only two
thirds (64.8 percent) of workers whose establishment changed owners in the
previous year remained employed at the same facility.
Table 11.16 presents the two-year mean earnings growth of workers
identiﬁed at the end of year T   1. The high wage growth apparent for em-
ployees coming from other nonmanufacturing industries and from un-
known industries or plants reﬂects the fact that employees from these
sources previously earned much less than other employees, which stems
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Table 11.14 Recently hired employees: General statistics for workers at year T   1
whose plants experienced an ownership change during year T
All ownership  No ownership 
Employee type changes change
Recently hired employees (between 
year T and T   1):
% Female 28.13 27.99
% Non-Swedish 12.53 13.16
% Age above mean 37.09 25.45
% Experience above mean 41.94 33.12
% Education less than high school 31.72 26.86
% Education to high school 52.56 55.01
% Education some college 15.72 18.13
All employees:
% Female 27.70 26.14
% Non-Swedish 13.08 12.33
% Age above mean 49.58 48.75
% Experience above mean 57.09 57.16
% Education less than high school 38.10 36.62
% Education to high school 49.11 49.84
% Education some college 12.78 13.54
Sample size for employees coming to plant:
All 123,789 1,507,679
With experience data 65,410 910,481
With education data 120,071 1,445,262
Sample size for all employees:
All 351,269 6,239,988
With experience data 156,689 2,858,277























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.from some combination of fewer working hours (some may have just en-
tered the workforce) and lower salaries.19 The patterns in tables 11.15 and
11.16 indicate greater mobility and higher earnings growth for Swedish
employees, younger and less-experienced workers, and employees with
higher levels of education.
We ﬁnd that new employees in ownership change plants experienced
lower earnings growth than employees being hired by other plants. Our
ﬁndings also imply that this relative earnings diﬀerential was greater for
women, non-Swedish born employees, young employees, experienced em-
ployees, and non-college-educated employees than for male, Swedish-
born, young, inexperienced, and college-educated employees.
11.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have generated some stylized facts concerning the av-
erage consequences of ownership change for productivity and investment
in human capital. The empirical analysis is based on a rich matched em-
ployer-employee data set, containing information on 19,010 Swedish man-
ufacturing plants for the years 1985 to 1998. As such, this chapter is the
ﬁrst plant-level study based on evidence from continental Europe and the
ﬁrst analysis of ownership change (in any country) using matched em-
ployer-employee data. In contrast to existing plant-level studies, we use
more robust econometric methods that adjust for survivor and measure-
ment error biases.
The results support theories of ownership change predicting improved
economic performance. Our ﬁndings are consistent with recent theoretical
and empirical evidence (see Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002; Maksimovic
and Phillips 2001, 2002) suggesting that takeovers and asset sales result in
the reallocation of a ﬁrm’s resources to more eﬃcient uses and to better
managers. We ﬁnd that establishments averaged 7 percent lower total fac-
tor productivity, and 2 percent lower labor productivity, than comparable
plants just before a change in ownership and steadily improved to normal
productivity thereafter. Short-term patterns (ﬁve years before and after
transactions) diﬀered from long-term patterns (ten years before and after
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19. For example, among all employees who experienced ownership change, those coming
from a nonmanufacturing industry in another ﬁrm earned in the base year only 30 percent of
the inﬂation-adjusted mean earnings, and those from an unknown industry or plant earned
in the base year only 52 percent of the inﬂation-adjusted mean earnings. These mean earn-
ings are below those for all other employee source categories in the table. Employees from 
another manufacturing industry and ﬁrm earned in the base year 65 percent of the inﬂation-
adjusted mean earnings, employees from another ﬁrm in the same industry earned 89 percent,
employees from the same plant earned 92 percent, employees from the acquired ﬁrm earned
94 percent, and employees from another plant of the acquiring ﬁrm earned 102 percent. As
these percentages suggest, employees entering plants that experienced ownership change
tended to earn slightly below the economy-wide mean when not controlling for industry- or
occupation-speciﬁc components of earnings.transactions) and varied substantially over individual years, a stylized fact
that underscores the beneﬁt of having a long annual panel.
Plants involved in an ownership change had higher output and employ-
ment before the transaction. The increase in labor productivity after the
transfer of ownership appears to be the result of a decline in output, com-
bined with an even larger reduction in employment. These patterns emerge
most strongly for full acquisitions and divestitures and unrelated acquisi-
tions.
We also ﬁnd that plants involved in an ownership change experienced an
upgrading in the quality of human capital. That is, we observe increases in
average employee age, experience, and the percentage of employees with a
college education. Ownership change also led to an increase in earnings
and a reduction in the percentage of female workers.
Our analysis of individual-level data allows us to directly track the move-
ment and relative compensation of workers whose establishments were in-
volved in an ownership change. Several stylized facts emerge from this
analysis. It appears that ownership change resulted in substantial job loss
for women and non-Swedish employees. However, a more comprehensive
analysis reveals that turnover rates among such employees were also high
in plants that did not experience an ownership change.
We also ﬁnd that employees who leave a plant in the aftermath of own-
ership change tend to be less experienced, younger workers. It is important
to note that Sweden has inﬂuential unions, with a membership rate of
about 70 percent. Collective agreements, which regulate some ﬁring proce-
dures, could lead to a last-in, ﬁrst-out policy that might have driven the
tendency for younger, less experienced workers to leave.20 Indeed, this pat-
tern also explains the high job loss for women and non-Swedes, since these
employees tend to be relatively inexperienced with shorter job tenure.
Another stylized fact is that highly-educated workers appear to be the
most mobile employees. The ﬁndings also imply that women, foreign-born,
and young workers employed at plants involved in an ownership change ex-
perience greater job loss and reductions in earnings than comparable
workers at plants that are not involved in such transactions. The latter re-
sult should be interpreted with caution because we do not have data on
hours worked.
In future work, we hope to implement the robustness tests outlined in
Van Biesebroeck (2004) by employing nonparametric and semiparametric
methods to compute productivity and then reestimating the various
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20. It is rare for a company to opt out of a collective agreement. How rare that is is reﬂected
in the case of the retail chain Toys R Us. When the ﬁrm opened its ﬁrst stores in Sweden, the
CEO refused to sign the collective agreement for retail workers. Their refusal to do so was
front page news in Sweden for several weeks. This led to a boycott of the company by other
unions, which meant that painters, carpenters, electricians, and other skilled workers refused
to work for them. After losing money due to the boycott, they signed the agreement.econometric models. Given our large sample size, we can also analyze
whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across industrial sectors in the im-
pacts of ownership change on economic performance and human capital.
Finally, it would be useful to discriminate among the three theories that
predict a positive eﬀect of ownership change on economic performance:
agency theory, matching theories of ownership change, and the capital up-
grading theory of ownership change.
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